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• Prospects for Agricultural
Trade of Developing Countries
I
• LOUIS M. GOREUX
INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION
AND DEVELOPMENT
• IN THE firstsectionof this paper the methodology followed in the FAO
projections is summarized, and some of the problems arising from the
introduction of prices in the projection model are discussed with particu-
lar attention to tree crops. In the second section, the trade prospects of
the lesser-developed countries (LDC) are reviewed for a number of
commo4ities. A broad distinction is made between the commodities for
which the major limiting factor is export outlets and those for which the
main limiting factor is the expansion of production in the LDC. In the
thfrd section the export outlets of the LDC are considered by destination:
developed, socialist, and LDC.1 Emphasis is placed on the limited scope
NOTE: This paper is based mainly on work carried out by the author during
• the preparation of the agricultural projections for 1970 and 1975 published by
FAO in 1962 and 1967. (The author was the main compiler of the FAO projec-
tions for 1970 published in 1962 and a major contributor to the projections for
1975 published in 1967.) The results of the UNCTAD projections for 1975 are
utilized to provide an over-all trade perspective for the agricultural export pros-
pects of the lesser developed countries. The paper was written while the author
was with the IBRD. The views expressed herein are the sole responsibility of the
author; they do not commit any of the agencies mentioned above.
The author benefitted greatly from the thoughtful comments made by Bela
Balassa on an earlier version of this paper at the time of the U-NBER conference.
Many of the points raised by Balassa are incorporated in this version. [Editor's
note: Balassa's comments do not appear in this volume since they have been
largely taken into account in the present revision of the original paper.1
1Followingthe usage of the UN the nations of the world have been classified in
three groups: (1) Developed countries with market economies—North America,
p
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for expanding the net agricultural exports from LDC to developed coun-
tries and on the need to investigate more fully the scope for expanding
trade between developing countries in future In the fourth sec-
tion, the prospects for LDC exports are compared for agricultural and
nonagricultural products. This section is concluded by an analysis of
the effect of the sharp decline in agricultural exports' share of the distri-
bution of export earnings between the LDC. The increasing factor of
unequality in the distribution of export earnings among LDC is illus-
trated by Lorenz curves for 1950, 1955, 1960, and 1965.
Annex I deals with sectoral demand projections in countries with
rapid urbanization. It analyzes the conditions under which projections
based on national averages lead to biased estimates. The method is based
on the covariance analysis of stratified household surveys and is illus-
trated by data for the USA and for Madagascar. Annex II analyzes the
relation between growth of exports and gross domestic product (GDP)
in a number of developing countries. Within countries the direct elas-
ticity between GDP and export earnings is generally significant, but once
the time trend is eliminated, the relation between the deviations from
the trend is weak. Between countries the correlation between the average
rates of growth of GDP and of exports is low. To reach a better under-
standing a distinction is drawn between the "accounting" effect of an
increase of export earnings on GDP and the "induced" effect, the first
being felt immediately and the second with a time lag. The hypothesis
of an "induced" lagged effect appears consistent with the data available
in several
METHODOLOGY
The methodology followed in the FAO projections for 1975 2doesnot
differ basically from the one used five years earlier in the projections
for 1970;however, the analysis was carried out more systematically
Western Europe (including Yugoslavia and Turkey), Japan, Australia, New Zea-
land and South Africa; (2) Countries with centrally planned economies—(Euro-
pean) Eastern Europe and U.S.S.R.; (Asiatic) mainland China, Outer Mongolia,
North Korea, and North Vietnam; (3) Developing countries with market econo-
mies. These three groups are often referred to as follows: Group 1, "Developed";
Group 2, "Socialist"; Group 3, "LDC." The nations of the world may also be
classified by income groups: Group 1 together with Group 2 European comprise
the "high-income countries"; Group 2 Asiatic together with Group 3, the "low-
income countries."
2 NationsFood and Agriculture Organization [FAO] Agricultural Corn-
modules Projections for 1975 and 1985, Rome, 1967.
United Nations FAO, Agricultural Commodities Projections for 1970, Rome,
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and ingreater depth. Demand, production, and trade were projected to
1975. The demand projections were extended to 1985 to provide a basis
• for the subregional studies of FAO's Indicative World Plan (IWP).
The main steps may be summarized as follows: formulation of popu-
lation and income assumptions; demand projections by commodity (and
commodity groups), with consistency checks by country regarding nu-
tritional intakes; projections of production by commodities, with con-
sistency checks by country between the growth of total agricultural pro-
duction and GDP; confrontation of world exportable supplies and world
import demand by commodities.
FAO intends to proceed at a later stage to the reconciliation of the
commodity approach at the world level with the subregional approach,
in which the emphasis is on production problems. This reconciliation is
an important step in the fonnulation of an indicative plan for agricultural
• development.
The UNCTAD projections,4 on the other hand, result from the com-
•
bination of the country and commodity approaches. Detailed country
studies based on an econometric model were conducted for about twenty-
• five developing countries, while estimates were made for the remaining
LDC. World commodity studies were undertaken in various degrees of
depth for the major LDC exports. For agricultural commodities the
UNCTAD projections drew heavily on the FAO study. For petrol, iron
ore, nonferrous metals, and textiles original studies were made. Their
results are presented as provisional, pending more detailed analysis by
the UNCTAD Commodity Division. Adjustments were made between
the results obtained in the country and commodity approaches so as to
reach consistent projections of exports and imports leading to an estima-
tion of the LDC trade gap.
Population and Income Assumptions
• The FAO and UNCTAD assumptions are about the same for population
but differ somewhat for GDP. First, the range between the high and the
• low GDP assumptions is twice as large in the FAO as in the UNCTAD
study. Second, the average growth rate for the LDC is higher in the
UNCTAD than in the FAO assumptions (see Table 1).
The comparison between the assumptions selected in 1961 in the
FAO projections for 1970 are compared with actual developments up
• to 1965 in Table 2. Population growth appears to have been underesti-
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD] General
of Trade Prospects and Capital Needs for Developing Countries. To be
published.
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TABLE 1
Population and GDP; Assumptions for
1965-75 Compared With past Trends











mated by 0.1 per cent a year in both developed and developing coun-
tries. The GDP growth up to 1965 fell within the range assumed. But
for the LDC, actual growth was closer to the low assumption than for
the developed countries. For the period 1958—65 a country-by-country
comparisoii between GDP assumptions and actual performances shows
that the dispersion between country rates was greater than assumed.
Under the high FAO assumption to 1975 the rate of GDP growth falls
between 4 and 7 per cent a year for 90 per cent of the countries, but
actual dispersion will probably be much wider.
Demand Projections
Per capita demand was projected at constant prices on the basis of the
assumed growth in per capita private consumption. The growth rates of
private consumption and GDP were assumed to be the same as those
under the low assumption. But in the LDC the former rate was taken
as lower than the latter so that the high assumption would reflect the
rising share of investment in GDP associated with an acceleration of the
rate of economic growth. Thus, for all LDC for which the assumption
of growth in per capita private consumption was high, the average growth
rate of total private consumption was only 5.2 per cent a year, compared











1958-70 3.9— 5.0 4.1—5.2
Four types of demand functions were used: log-log, semilog, log-
inverse (log y =a—) forcommodities likely to reach a saturation
level, and log-log-inverse (log y =a— — clog x) for cereals and
roots in the LDC to allow for an increase in per capita consumption in
a first stage and for a decline in a second stage. For each country per
capita demand was projected by commodity and for aggregates, e.g.,
demand for all food valued at farm prices, total caloric intake, total
protein intake. Since the accuracy of the projection was generally higher
for aggregates (e.g., consumption of total calories in the U.S.) than for
individual commodities (consumption of calories from pork, beef, etc.),
consistency was reached mainly by adjusting projections for certain indi-
vidual commodities downward.
The values of the elasticity coefficients and the type of demand func-
tion were originally selected mainly on the basis of a survey-analysis of
households, using time-series analysis as a check whenever possible. A
number of adjustments were made on the basis of nutritional considera-
tions. For example, in the demand for all caloric intake, the average
caloric requirement in a given country was used to check the value of
the parameter of the log-inverse function characterizing the level of the
horizontal asymptote, i.e., the saturation level in terms of calories. Nutri-
tional factors were taken into account for checking the values of the
parameters characterizing the maximum level reached, for example, for
all cereals, with the log-log-inverse function.
nr'
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TABLE 2
FAQ Growth Assumptions, 1958-70, Compared With
Actual Growth, 1958-65
(in percentage per annum compounded)20 Agriculture in World Economy
For major changes in the food consumption pattern the relationships
between the principal classes of those nutrients that reflect physiological
needs are generally more stable than the relationships between the classes
of foods that reflect consumer tastes. One of the original features of
these demand projections is the systematic combination of the statistical
analysis of the nutrients contained in the food items with the classical
econometric analysis by Engel curves. This combined approach proved
particularly fruitful in providing an econometric basis for the analysis of
nutritional policies.
With commod,ities such as coffee, cocoa, tea, and sugar, the emphasis
was placed on time-series analysis, because fairly reliable data are avail-
able for the postwar period. The estimation of the price elasticity per-
mitted assessment of the impact of a price change on demand. For the
agricultural raw materials no uniform method was followed. Whenever
possible, the analysis was made by end-uses.
During the preparation of the projections for 1975, those made in
1961 for cocoa, coffee, tea, sugar, and oils were compared with actual
developments during the last five years. Using the demand function
selected in 1961 for the various countries, consumption was calculated
on the basis of actual changes in population, GDP, and prices. The
relative difference between calculated and actual consumption for the
five-year period is shown on Table 3. For the developed countries as a
group as well as for the developed and developing countries together,
the accuracy of the demand projections was good, especially if account
is taken of the amplitude of the price changes (—37 per cent for cocoa,
—12per cent for coffee, and —10per cent for tea)Asmight be ex-
pected, the accuracy was lower for developing than for developed coun-
tries. The small differences for broad groups conceal, however, sub-
stantial differences for a number of countries.
It can be argued that projections of demand based on national
averages are not very meaningful for developing countries. National
averages conceal major differences between the rural population living
mainly in a subsistence economy and the urban population living in a
market economy. In a country with rapid urbanization projections based
on national averages could therefore be misleading. Since data for
sectoral projections are not often available, it was considered worth-
Average import unit value for importing countries, and retail price for pro-
ducers. The price elasticity coefficients used for cocoa were those given in Agri-
culturalCommodities Projections for 1970;for coffee and tea, those given in
AgriculturalCommodities in the UN Development Decade, 1963,were used. No




—increase 3.8 4.7 2.12.4 1.5
Actual increase 3.7 5.3 1.6 2.1 2.2
Difference 0.1 —.6 0.5 0.3 —.7
LDC
Projecteda —increase 5.2 0.9 4.74.3 4.4
Actual increase 7.4 3.9 5.33.9 3.3
Difference 1.8 3.0 —.60.4 1.1
Totals
Projecteda —increase 4.1 5.1 2.73.4 2.6
Actual increase 4.5 5.02.42.9 2.6
Difference —.4 0.1 0.30.5 0
Source: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, Agri-
cultural Commodoties Projections 1975-85, Vol.I,table 8,p.176;
Vol. II, tables 1.22-1.25, pp. 5 1-54, Rome, 1967.
aOn the basis of selected demand functions adjusted for actual
population and income increase and—in the case of coffee, cocoa, and
tea—for actual price change.
while to analyze the conditions under which the global projections lead
to substantial bias. This analysis is presented in annex I.
Trends over the period 1950—63 were taken as the starting point. The
historical analysis was carried out for about thirty-five individual com-
modities, for groups of commodities, and for all agricultural output.
For crops, area yields and output were projected separately.
The systematic analysis of past trends was supplemented by a review




LDC and Developed Market Economies:
Coniparison between Consumption Growth as Projected by FAQ
for 1970a and Actual Growth over a Five-Year Period.




















rLow Assumption High Assumption
Agricultural sector 2.8 . 3.5
Nonagricultural sector 4.2 6.0
GDP 3.8 5.2
various institutions. The FAO production projections utilize information
from various sources; the reasoning underlying the derivation and selec-
tion of the figures can best be shown on an ad hoc basis in the detailed
commodity notes.
For developed countries a single projection of agricultural produc-
tion was made. This seems justified in view of the tenuous link between
the growth of the value added in the agricultural and in the nonagricul-
tural sectors. This single projection was associated with each of the two
GDP assumptions. Therefore, for the temperate zone products as well
as for the noncompeting tropical food and beverages, the net import
demand of the developed countries is systematically larger in the high-
GDP-assumption category than in the low. In short, the projections of
production in the developed countries reflect the expectations of the
commodity specialists.
For the LDC two projections were made for agricultural production.
The low-production projection was associated with the low-GDP assump-
tion and the high projection with the high GDP assumption. A comple-
mentarity was assumed between the growth of the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors as shown in Table 4. Because of this assumption,6
the net import demand for a number of commodities—cereals in par-
ticular—was lower under the high-GDP assumption than under the
low.
In practice, two production projections were made for each com-
modity (except for some tree crops). The low projection was "con-
servative." The high projection was "optimistic," implying the success-
similar assumption of complementarity has been made between the growth
of cereals production and GDP. See the recent USDA study on the LDC cereals
gap, "World Food Situation," USDA FAER N.35 Washington, Sept., 1967.
S
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TABLE4
AllLDC: Growth Rates for the Agricultural and Nonagricultural
Sectors, 1962-75, Projected Under Two Assumptions
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ful implementation of a number of measures reviewed in the commodity
notes. The projections by commodities (or commodity groups) were
then aggregated for each country to measure the growth for the whole
agricultural production and were then compared with the GDP assump-
tions. When the relative rates of growth implied for the agricultural and
nonagricultural sectors were not considered compatible, the production
projections were adjusted for the principal commodities.
Undoubtedly a substantial element of subjectivity is attached to the
production projections. This margin of subjectivity can only be reduced
by a systematic analysis of the factors influencing production. Time
series in developing countries are generally not accurate enough for
this type of analysis. It is therefore necessary to exploit more systemat-
ically the findings of cross-section studies. The field missions under-
taken within the framework of the tripartite coffee study, as well as the
subregional studies carried out for the IWP have shown that a substan-
tial amount of material could be collected. But the systematic analysis
of this material is a delicate and lengthy task.
Trade Projections
The growth coefficients projected for domestic production and utiliza-
tion by country or country groups for the period 1962—75 were applied
to the world commodity balance sheets established for the base period
1961—63. This led to a balancing item for 1975, which has to be in-
terpreted as the first approximation of the potential net import require-
ment or net exportable supply for any given country and, of the tendency
towards surplus or shortage for the world as a whole. This, together with
the analysis of past trends in imports and exports, provided the basis
for the analysis of the commodity prospects.
Obviously, if we ignore the effect of statistical inaccuracies, world
imports and exports wifi ultimately balance each other for each com-
modity through a series of adjustments in production and consumption
and eventually through changes in the levels of stocks. For the com-
modities produced mainly for exports, such as cocoa and coffee, such an
adjustment could be made on a commodity basis. But, for the basic food
items that loom large in the import bill of the LDC, it could not be made
without reference to the balances of payment of the importing countries,
since these will also ultimately have to be in equilibrium. Since the
analysis of the balance of payments falls far outside the scope of the
FAO study, an equilibrium between imports and exports was not forced
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It should also be noted that the method followed (projection of
domestic demand and production) led to a first approximation of the
net import or net exportable supplies for a commodity in a given coun-
try and not of the gross imports or gross exports. For a well-defined
primary product such as rice or peanuts, the concept of net import is
the most relevant to agricultural planning in a given country, since re-
exports—which generally account for the major part of the difference
between gross and net—have little to do with agricultural activities. For
a group of countries, the concept of net trade may, however, be mis-
leading. An increase in the exportable oil surplus of West Africa may
not be offset by an equivalent increase in the potential deficit of india.
India may not have the foreign exchange to import from West Africa.
Its effective imports may be lower than its potential demand; and it may
restrict them to purchases under concessional terms. Therefore, to
analyze the trade problems of the LDC the net exports of the net-export-
ing countries and the net imports of the net-importing countries were
summed separately for each type of commodity. The growth rate of the
sum of the net imports of the deficit countries provided a proxy for the
growth rate of gross imports; the growth of the sum of the net exports of
the exporting countries provided a proxy for the growth of gross exports.
However, it would have been preferable to project gross and net im-
ports simultaneously to avoid confusion. Statistics are usually published
in terms of gross imports and exports, and the net trade deficit of a
country is usually projected by subtracting total gross exports from
total gross imports rather than by adding up the sum of the projected
net imports for each commodity.
The approach followed by UNCTAD was not the same, since a
major objective was to arrive at the "capital needs of developing coun-
tries." The required capital flow was taken as equal to the deficit of the
current account balance of the LDC, assuming no monetary movement
such as changes in reserves or IMF drawings. The deficit of current
accounts was estimated as the sum of the deficit in three balances: im-
port-export of commodities, invisibles, and investment income.
The UNCTAD study had therefore to come out with one figure for
the "import-export gap," which was reached through appropriate adjust-
ments at the country and commodity level for each of the high- and
low-GDP assumptions. The trade projections were expressed in terms
of gross exports and gross imports. While the FAO study attempted to
project the net import demand mainly as the balance between projected
domestic demand and production, using the trends in imports mainly asLess Developed Countries 25
__
I
acheck, the UNCTAD study relied primarily on the relationships be-
tween gross imports by groups and major economic mdi-
• cators.
I The Problem of Prices
• The weakest point in the projection model is the absence of prices. As
• previously noted in the FAO projections published in 1962 and 1967
as well as in the UNCTAD projections, prices were introduced through
the back door and often in a qualitative manner. This deficiency can be
explained by two considerations. First, a major purpose of the FAO
projections published in 1967 was to provide a first approximation of
the demand for food as a starting point for the study of production
programs to be carried out in the subregional studies of the IWP.T Sec-
ond, projecting price trends a decade ahead or more is a risky exercise.
Rather than a clear time trend, the historical price series generally show
substantial fluctuations with some kind of periodicity. This suggests that
• the price-forecasting problem has to be approached from an autoregres-
sive angle, taking into account lagged supply responses, rather than purely
•
in terms of trends. An attempt is made below to consider some of the
problems connected with the introduction of prices in the projection
model.
The main difficulty is the limitation of our knowledge of the response
a of production to prices. Although a number of econometric studies deal
with the subject, they are generally restricted in the developing countries
to the impact of prices on the land area devoted to a particular commod-
ity. Few econometric studies deal with the impact of prices on yields and
with the impact of average farm prices on the level of total agricultural
output in the LDC. We shall not consider here the general problem raised
by a price projection model for agriculture as a whole including direct
and cross-price elasticities, since the problem is intractable at the world
level with the data presently available. We shall limit ourselves to the
consideration of a single-commodity model relating to a typical export
crop and assuming all cross-price elasticities equal to zero. Further, we
shall initially assume prices to producers and consumers to vary pro-
portionally with world market prices; this assumption together with that
d of constant elasticity is very convenient for expository purposes.
If there is no lag in demand and no lag in production responses to
-0 The committee on commodity problems, for which the projections were pre-
d pared, stressed that price adjustments should be introduced only after completion
of the subregional studies.
0
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prices, the change in prices needed to bring a balance between demand





P =pricelevel in the reference period,
F' =projectedprice level to clear the market,
D =demandprojected at constant prices,
• S =productionprojected at constant prices,
b1=short-termprice elasticity of demand,
b2,0 =short-termprice elasticity of supply.
Although response of demand to price is generally somewhat higher
in the long term than in the short term, the assumption of no lag in
response to price might be considered as an acceptable first approxima-
tion for demand. But for production, this assumption is, a priori, not
acceptable. For most agricultural products, tree crops in particular, the
supply response is much higher in the long than in the short term.
In the simplest commodity model, the demand and supply functions
can be written with time lags in the form of equations 2 and 3, assum-
ing c1 and c2 constantthroughout the projection period.
k




(3) log=a2+ Z b2,1 log Pg_, + C2t +
1=0
with = =ofor 0 > o
= =o
Similarly, the reduced form of the price equation can be expressed in
relation to a trend factor by:
(4) log=a++ xt
S In practice c1andc2willnot be constant. Demand is generally not projected
on the basis of constant elasticity and world demand results from the aggregation
of country projections. If the projections imply an acceleration of prpductivity
growth, the rate of production growth will generally increase through the pro-
jection period either smoothly or by steps..rr
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The levelwhich will clear the market, will be such that:
cl—c2
7 , whereb0 =b2,0—b1,0
b0
J=k





Ifall the roots of equation 6 are smaller than unity in absolute value,
the process Xt is stationary.
• j=k
r (6) =
Thevariance ofcan be decomposed in two elements as shown in
equation 7: the variance of the purely random term Ct and the variance
e due to the lagged responses:
S (7) Var(xg) = +
a coefficients by:
aTbO + at_i b1 + + =owith=ofor r>k
The autocorrelation coefficients and the spectral density can be de-
rived from the at coefficients; the analysis of the spectrum provides a
convenient way to assess the periodicity of the autoregressive process Xt
generated by the parametersof equation 5.
The system can be simplified, if the short- and long-term responses to
price are concentrated at specific points of time. For example, for cocoa
during the postwar period, the simplest distributed lag model providing
a satisfactory statistical fit can be constructed by introducing, together
with a current response to prices, an eleven-year lag reflecting the impact
of prices on the size of plantings. Equation 5 characterizing the auto-
regressive process can then be written:
b0
(5 ) Xg= +
b11
with =028 Agriculture in World Economy
The model will be stable only if the elasticity in the current year b0
is higher than the elasticity b11. The crucial parameter is therefore:
b11
Equation 7 can be written:
(7')
=1
If /3isequal to 0.3, only 10 per cent of the variance ofis explained
by the lagged responses to price; the system is strongly convergent. For
all forecasting purposes the lagged response can be ignored and Xtap-
proximated bytheprojected price change can then be computed from
equation 1. The price trend can be expressed in the form of equation 4.
For example, if production at constant prices were to rise by 3 per cent
a year and demand by 2 per cent, the price would decline by 2.5 per
cent a year for b0 =b2,0—b1,0=0.4.
If $isequal to 0.7, half of the variance ofis explained by the back-
ward linkage. Prices a deca4e ahead have to be projected by recurrence.
If /3 is equal to 0.9, 80 per cent of the variance of Xtisexplained by
the linkage. The pronounced cyclical influence appears from the spectral
density (0.05, 0.1, and 19 respectively for zero,and ir).Ignoringthe
backward lilikage would therefore have generally led to considerable
forecasting errors.
If /3 is higher than unity, the system is explosive. In practice, the sys-
tern does not explode since prices cannot become negative. It is therefore
necessary to introduce into the model a number of constraints reflecting,
in particular, the reactions of the market when prices fall below a given
level.
When prices are above the long-term equilibrium level, the short-term
production response to price is very low; in the case of cocoa, it did not
appear statistically significant. But once the producer's price falls below
the marginal variable cost, the short-term production response rises very
sharply; in the case of cocoa it seems that the low prices prevailing about
1965 reduced supply significantly. Without government intervention the
floor price in a downswing would largely depend on the level of the
variable production cost and its distribution among producers. Since the
variable production cost is low for tree crops, governments often inter-
vene before this limit is reached, by cutting subsidies on fertilizers and
pesticides and by withdrawing part of the production from the marketnr
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through various measures. The high short-term supply response when
prices fall below a given level, together with the accumulation of stocks,
act to dampen the price trough although they extend its duration.
In the price upswing little can be done to increase supply in the short
run once the reserve stocks have been exhausted, although the price
decline in the subsequent decade can be reduced by raising export taxes.
In the short term the price increase can be reduced only if the consumer's
response to a price increase becomes stronger once a given price level
has been exceeded. The reaction of U.S. consumers to the peak coffee
price of 1954 gives some support to this hypothesis. But on the whole
the reaction of the market against a price boom is weak in the short
term. This asymmetry in the short-term response of the market is reflected
in the shape of the price cycle, with its sharp peaks and dampened but
prolonged troughs. Since 1892, the period of the coffee cycle has varied
between fifteen and twenty-five years with an average of twenty years,
and the length of the upswing has been only about a third that of the
downswing.
In view of the variability in the length of the trough, direct analysis
of the past price series is of limited forecasting value. What happened
in 1900 has obviously little relevance to what will occur in 1975. For
forecasting purposes we have to start from the structural equations 2
and 3, with elasticity coefficients that are for all practical purposes esti-
mate4 from the postwar period. If the ratio between the variance of Xt
andtcomputedfor the postwar period is comparable to the theoretical
ratio given by equation 7 (assuming no error in the specification of the
model and in the estimation of the parameters), the model, despite its
imperfections, will be useful in explaining the nature of price variations.
In the case of cocoa the impact of prices on the consumption of grind-
ings and on the demand for stocks can be estimated from postwar data
with reasonable accuracy. For consumption the accuracy is improved by
the introduction of lags, which suggests that all of the price impact is
not felt during the current year. For stocks the accuracy is improved by
introducing future prices. Changes in future prices are expressed as a
function of the expecte4 changes in supply and demand, and stocks are
expressed as a hyperbolic function of the difference between future and
spot prices. Although the quantity produced can generally be taken as
unaffected by the current price, the system is not recursive because of
the interdependence between the demand for grindings and the demand
for stocks. This problem can be dealt with by two-stage least squares.
A serious problem of estimation arises with the production function.
The increase in cocoa output depends on the combination of two factors:
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(1) the size of the plantings by age groups, which is correlated with
producers' price lagged seven to thirteen years; (2) the yield per tree
by age groups, which is correlated with time because of the introduction
of improved varieties and the improvement of cultural practices with
wider use of pesticides and fertilizers. Because of the lack of data on
plantings, lagged prices have to be used as a proxy for plantings. But in
view of the length of the cycle, the price lagged is correlated with time
during the postwar period. It is therefore not possible to disentangle
precisely the relative weights of the lagged price response and of the
technological progress in the production growth during this
period. Unfortunately, the level of the price projected for 1975 is very
sensitive to the relative weights given to these two factors. Placing too
much weight on technological improvements would lead to a declining
price trend in the 1970's. Placing too much weight on the response of
production to lagged prices would give a very sharp uptrend in the same
period. One way to resolve this dilemma is to estimate the impact of
technological progress from other sources, in particular from agronomic
data on the likely impact of fertilizers, pesticides, and improved varieties.
From this estimate, the price response can be measured by conditional
regressions.
Although strong reservations are necessary concerning the accuracy of
the production function, the results of various experiments suggest that
the module of some of the roots of equation 6 may be as high as unity.
It is therefore essential to introduce into the system stabilization con-
straints, such as a short-term production response when the world market
price falls below a given level (22 cents a pound is a likely figure) and
government interventions. To provide valuable long-term price forecasts,
the econometric model has therefore to reach a fairly high level of so-
phistication. From an operational point of view, the problem is to know
whether a sophisticated model will provide more valuable answers than
a less formalized approach leaving more room for informed judgment.
This obviously depends on the nature of the questions that have to be
answered by the model.
If the primary objective is to provide guidelines for the production
policy or even to reach a reasonable forecast of. LDC export earnings,
it is doubtful whether the construction of a series of commodity models
would, in the short term, substantially improve the quality of the final
forecast. If the primary objective is to assess the relative merits of al-
ternative schemes for stabilizing the market and increasing LDC earn-
ings, the model approach is a worthwhile investment. It compels speci- r
fication of assumptions and provides a way to assess the feedbacks.
In the FAO projections for 1970 the demand curve was projected atLess Developed Countries 31
three alternative price levels, 18, 24, and 30 cents per pound.9 The low-
est price of 18 cents was taken as the level below which production
woul4 react in the short term, although it was not easy at the time to say a
whether the trough would be over by 1970. The price range selected in
1961 was not unreasonable; six years later a price range of 21 to 29 cents
• was taken as the basis for the negotiation of a cocoa agreement that
should have covered the year 1970. In the projections for 1975 prepared
in 1967 it was indicated that the trough would be over by 1975 and that
prices around 1975 would be higher than in 1963—65.
In the price stabilization study initiated by the IMF and the World
Bank the author felt much more strongly the need for the model ap-
proach. The emphasis was not on forecasting, but rather on assessing the
genuine stability of the market without intervention, as well as the rela-
tive merits of various types of interventions. Since buffer stock was an
important issue, attention was given to stochastic processes, with the
impact of various policies simulated on a series of samples generated
• I fromthe post-war data by the Monte Carlo method.
EXPORT PROSPECTS FOR THE MAIN
• AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
To assess the export prospects of developing countries for agricultural
commodities it is convenient to draw a distinction between two main
groups: (1) the trad,itional LDC export commodities, for which the
major problem is outlet; and (2) cereals, livestock, and wood products,
where the major problem for the developing countries is to increase their
• production. In 196 1—63 the LDC had a net export surplus of 8.5
billion dollars for the first group of products but a net deficit of one
billion dollars for the second.
Of the first group (coffee, cocoa, tea, bananas, tobacco, oils, sugar,
rubber, and fibers), the major portion of world exports is accounted for
by developing countries, half of whose pro4uction is exported, with the
bulk of these exports going to high-income countries. The growth pros-
pects for developing countries' exports are dominated by the rate of
expansion of the import demand in the high-income countries. For
developing countries as a whole, a marginal increase in the quantities of
most tropical food and beverages exported leads, all things being equal,
to a reduction of export earnings. This reflects the combination of the
dominant position of these countries in the world export of these corn-
modities with the low price elasticity of world import demand for them.
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More precisely, these commodities' share of world exports usually cx-
ceeds the absolute value of the price elasticity of the world import de-
mand for them.
Of the second group of commodities (cereals, livestock, and forest
products), developing countries are marginal suppliers in world markets;
if rice is excluded, hardly 5percent of world exports originate in de-
veloping countries. These exports are marginal in relation to the pro-
duction of the developing countries and to the consumption of the high-
income countries. For this group of commodities world has ex-
panded rapidly during the last decade, increasing twice as fast as for the
previous group.
Unfortunately, production in the LDC increased more slowly for the
second than for the first group of commodities, and only a few develop-
ing countries were able to take advantage of the rapidly expanding
markets. The share of the LDC in the quantum of world agricultural
exports steadily since 1950. Moreover, between 1959—60 and
1965—66 average unit value of agricultural exports 10improvedby 8
per cent for the developed countries but did not show any increase for
the LDC. In part this reflects the superiority of the developed over the
developing countries in regard to adaptability of the production pattern
to a rapidly changing world demand. In the 1960's, developed countries
succeeded in controlling the volume of their agricultural production
better than the developing countries; but many of the latter have not yet
succeeded in reallocating their agricultural resources to take full advan-
tage of the rapidly expanding domestic or foreign markets.
First Commodity Group
The level of the import demand in the high-income countries is the
most important limiting factor to the expansion of LDC exports. The
projection of the net import demand of the high-income countries there-
fore provides the starting point for assessing the potential export growth
of the LDC.
TROPICAL NONCOMPETING COMMODITIES (COFFEE, COCOA,
TEA, BANANAS)
The import demand of the developed countries, or more specifically
their quantity-price demand schedule, can be projected fairly accurately.
If we assume a 10 per cent yearly demand growth in Eastern Europe,
10GeneralAgreement on Trade and Tariffs [GATT], Internazional Trade 1966,
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and if we use the high GDP assumption for the developed countries,
the total import demand of high-income developed countries for coffee,
cocoa, bananas, and tea, at constant prices, may not increase by much
more than 2.5percent a year during the next decade. The remaining
tariffs and special taxes in developed countries should be eliminated, but
the impact of such measures will be small. The major problem is the
price level.
The price elasticity of the import demand in the high-income coun-
tries is low. The long-term elasticity is somewhat higher than the short-
term elasticity but nevertheless, measured at the import level, remains
substantially lower than unity. Export earnings of LDC may therefore
be raise4 by restricting supply; the coffee agreement is a case in point.
If, instead of restricting exports, Meade's proposalhad been applied,
coffee prices might have fallen to half of their present level. To keep
foreign exchange receipts of the coffee exporting countries at their pres-
ent level, an income transfer of the order of one billion dollars a year
would have been required. In the prevailing international context it is
doubtful that the coffee-producing countries would have received one
billion dollars in the form of untied grants in addition to the aid they
receive today. In terms of foreign exchange the coffee countries have
fared better so far with a policy of restricting supplies.
If, however, exports have been on the whole successfully controlled,
the same does not apply to production. Many coffee-producing countries
have accumulated useless stocks. The cost in terms of social opportunity
of producing these surplus stocks was not negligible. For example, in
Guatemala the cost of the imported fertilizer and pesticide applied on
coffee can be valued at 3 million dollars c.i.f. Without pesticides and
fertilizers coffee production would still have exceeded requirements.
If output were restricte4 by acreage quota, the foreign-exchange loss in
terms of fertilizers and pesticides would be higher.
The major problem arising from any price-raising scheme is its im-
pact on production. The coffee surplus in the 1960's is largely due to
the massive plantings of the early 1950's when prices reached peak
levels. The free-market equilibrium in the 1960's would have led to very
low prices, since in the short term a substantial curtailment of coffee
production would have required a fall in prices below the variable pro-
duction cost. A very low price in the 1960's could have generated a
sharp price upswing in the second part of the 1970's.
11J•E.Meade, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), Geneva 1964, Proceedings, Vol. 3, Commodity Trade, The Inter-
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(
As a means of raising LDC export earnings, an import levy scheme
has considerably more appeal than a scheme based only on quantitative
export restrictions. To break the cycle, the level of the import levy should
be variable. However, in view of the lagged, production response the
introduction of an import levy scheme during the downward price swing
• would not permit dispensing with quotas during the initial years.
• Let us assume that the price paid by the high-income countries is 30,
and that, in a given year, 25goesdirectly to the exporting countries and
5toan international diversification fund. The proceeds collected from
the import levy could then be redistributed to the coffee exporters in
the form of grants to compensate the prociucing countries ready to accept
a reduction in their export quota. A country with a high opportunity cost
would, a priori, be more attracted by a grant of a given amount to reduce
its export quota one ton, than a country with a very low opportunity cost.
To facilitate rational choice, a study of the relative opportunity costs
would be needed. In addition to an analysis of the production costs of
the specific commodities subject to an export quota (as carried out in
the tripartite coffee study), a general economic survey of the country
to assess opportunity costs would be required. For a country to produce
so much of commodity A or commodity B in compliance with the direc-
tives of an international body of technocrats could be dangerous. But in
practice the technocrats would only be asked to produce a study, of
which the governments of the countries concerned could, avail themselves
in deciding whether to accept a quota reduction in exchange for a given
grant. One could expect that a country with a high opportunity cost would
be ready to give up part of its quota at a given price. The larger the re-
sources of the international diversification fund, the greater would, be
the flexibility for revision of the quota.
Such grants might be given entirely or partly for specific projects.
Within agriculture, the areas that would most often require particular
investigation for such projects are livestock, feedstuffs, forestry indus-
tries, agricultural processing industries, and production of agricultural
prerequisites. But there is no reason for excluding the manufacturing
industry proper, if prospects are better there.
TROPICAL COMPETING COMMODITIES (SUGAR, OILS, AND OILCAKES)
Sugar and oils accounted in 1961—63 for 30 per cent of the LDC
net export earnings derived from the commodities covered in the FAO
study. From 1952—54 to 1961—63, net exports of sugar, oils, and oil-
cakes from the LDC to the rest of the world, increased by about oneLess Developed Countries 35
billion dollars. But the projections give a radically different picture; they
suggest a reduction in the absolute level of the net import demand of
the high-income countries.
Sugar. The reduction projected for the net importation of sugar into
the high-income countries reflects the slackening of the growth of con-
sumption in those countries as per capita intake gets nearer to the satu-
ration level.
As shown in Table 5, the slowdown projected for the developed coun-
tries is the continuation of a trend that has already been very noticeable
and would have been even more noticeable if figures had been expressed
on a per capita basis. In Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. the slowdown
projected is much more dramatic. The projected consumption level—
halfway between the U.S. and the U.K. level—may be too low; however,
for physiological reasons, the tremendous rate of consumption growth
recorded during the last fifteen years is bound to decline sharply.
In brief, it does not seem that in high-income countries, sugar con-
sumption could increase by much more than 2 per cent a year from
1965 to 1975. On the other hand, sugar production increased steadily
by 5 per cent a year in those countries over the last fifteen years, and,
from a technical point of view, pro4uction could still increase very sub-






Developed countries 3.5 2.2 1.8
Eastern Europe, USSR 7.6 7.8 2.1
Total 4.4 3.8 1.9
Production
Developed countries 4.2 4.11 2.8
Eastern Europe, USSR 6.5 5.9 2.7
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ments of high-income countriesare therefore likely to decline unless
there is a basic change in theirproduction policy.
In the LDC gross exportablesupplies could increase muchmore
rapidly than gross import requirements.If imports of mainland China
do not rise tremendously,a strong surplus situation is bound to prevail
on the world sugar market. The burden of theadjustment would fall on
the exporting countries, whichwould have to forego expansion andpos-
sibly cut their production, althoughthey are as a rule low-cost producers.
Prices cjo not play a useful rolein the allocation of worldresources
devoted to sugar, because thereare so many different prices for sugar.
• Most importing countries protect theirdomestic industries withguaran-
teed prices. Most exporting countriesreceive preferential prices in
domestic or foreign markets forat least part of their production. Conse-
quently, on the residual "free market,"prices fluctuate very widely.
From an average of 8.3 cents in 1963,prices on the free market fellto
an average of 2 cents in 1965. Among agriculturalproducts sugar prob-
ably offers the most striking exampleof resource misallocation at the
world level.
Oils. Owing to the variety of productsand end uses, projections for oils
are very complex and uncertain. Nevertheless,contrary to past perform-
ance, the gross exports of high-income countriesmay increase as rapidly,
if not more rapidly, than theirgross imports. The reasons for thisare
as follows: On the demand side—for fooduses—the increase in per
capita consumption of all oils and fatswill slow down, as in thecase of
sugar, with Consumption even in Southern Europeapproaching satura-
tion by l975—for nonfooduses—the competition from synthetics will
increase. On the supply side, productionof animal fats and soybean oil
is bound to increase rapidly followingthe expansion projected for live-
stock production. For animal fats thelink is obvious; for soybean oil
it is explained by the fact thatoil is a by-product of soybean cakein
great demamj for livestock feeding.
Among developed countriesmost of the increase projected forgross
exports is accounted for by U.S.exports of soybean oil, while half of
the increase in thegross imports of developed countries would betaken
by Japan. For all LDC, the increase ingross exportable supplies (mainly
from Africa, the Philippines, and Argentina)could be of the same order
of magnitude as the increase ingross import requirements. However, in
the past most of LDC exportswent to the developed countries andvery
little to other developing countries.The projected deficit (half of it in
India and Pakistan) may be filledpartly by concessional soybean oil
LrT
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sales, and the market for LDC with exportable supplies may be very
I small. In the absence of arrangements to promote trade between LDC
the prospects for the developing countries with exportable supplies are
not favorable unless the net import demand of the centrally planned
countries increases greatly. For oilcakes however the prospects remain
favorable.
AGRICULTURAL RAW MATERIALS (COTTON, JUTE, SIZAL,
ABACA, RUBBER)
Between1960 and 1965, the average unit value of LDC exports de-
clined by about 20 per cent for this group of commodities, more than
offsetting the increase in the volume of their exports. Prices have de-
clined since 1965 an4 are expected to decline still further, with a result-
ant reduction in LDC export earnings. However, the slow expansion or
decline projected for LDC exports of raw jute and cotton reflects partly
the projected increase in their exports of textile goods. Taking rubber andraw fibers together with cotton and jute goods, export earnings of
the LDC might increase slightly. The gain would be even more sub-
stantial if account were taken of the reduction of LDC import of textile
goods from developed countries.
Among the remedies proposed to improve the competitive position of
the natural pro4ucts versus synthetics are: reduction of short-term fluc-
tuations, research for new uses, and reduction of production costs. A
number of experts argue that the production costs of natural rubber with
high-yielding varieties could remain competitive with synthetic rubber.
If it were possible to insure natural rubber producers of a minimum price
five to ten years ahead, even at a substantially lower level of production
than the present one, an insurance scheme to promote investment of
•
. high-yieldingplantings might be considered. This might lead to a better
allocation of resources between developed and developing countries in
terms of alternative opportunity costs. However, the uncertainty about
technological advance in synthetic rubber for the international corn-





r (livestock, cereals, wood products and miscellaneous)
Developing countries have a net export surplus only for beef, coarse
• grains, and round woods. Only a limited number of LDC export these
.1 three commodities, and export is directed mainly to the market of the38 Agriculture in World Economy
high-income countries. These exports increased rapidly over the last
decade and could continue to do so over the next.
Meat.Ifborder trade, which is not accurately recorded, is excluded from
consideration, the number of developing countries entering in the world
market as significant exporters is small. More than 90 per cent of meat
exports from the LDC originate in Argentina, Uruguay, Mexico, and part
of East Africa. Of this meat more than 90 per cent is beef.
According to most livestock experts the main bottleneck encountered
in increasing output in the developing countries is feed. Emphasis should
therefore be placed on higher yield per animal rather than on larger
herds. The key problem is how to increase production and improve the
sanitary conditions. The possibility of expanding exports, however, de-
pends greatly on the growth in domestic consumption. This growth is
illustrated for Mexico, East Africa, and Argentina in Table 6.
In Mexico, beef consumption per capita is only one-fourth of the level
prevailing today in Australia and the United States. To keep per capita
consumption at its present level beef supplies in Mexico should rise by
3.5 per cent per year. To allow for the increase in per capita demand
generated by higher personal income, supplies should rise by 5.3 per
cent per year. Such a rate appears enormous as compared with past
performances of countries with a dynamic livestock economy. Thus, in
Australia and New Zealand, beef production increased on an average
only 3.4 per cent per year during the decade 1951—53 to 1961—63. This
rapid increase took place as a result of large investments stimulated by
the favorable prospects on the world beef market. During the same
decade the production record of 5 per cent growth per year was held
by the Common Market countries. But this was achieved only by using
up a large part of the existing calf reserves.
In East Africa the situation is somewhat more favorable than in
Mexico because population is expected to increase by only 2.2 per cent
instead of 3.5 per cent a year. Nevertheless, total domestic demand is
projected to increase by almost 4 per cent per year at constant prices.
A substantial increase in exportable supplies could be achieved only if
the control of animal diseases were coupled with a policy of high beef
prices to reduce the increase projected for the domestic demand as well
as stimulate local production. At present more than 80 per cent of East
African meat exports consist of canned meat, because their chilled meat
or live animals are generally unable to meet the strict health requirements
of most of the importing countries. Since most meat-exporting countries
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&
onthe world market. As long as East African exports remain restricted
to canned meat, the export sector will not provide the necessary price
incentive to build up a dynamic livestock industry. But if animal diseases
could be controlled through large-scale eradication programs, the export
sector could be oriented toward the chilled beef market and could offer
to local producers the high prices needed to expand production rapidly.
A large fraction of the high cuts of beef could thus be exported; and
with the price differential, domestic consumption would be reoriented
to low cuts of beef and other types of meat.
In Argentina and Uruguay per capita beef consumption today is a!-
most twice as high as in Australia or the United States. There does not
appear to be any need for increasing this exceptionally high level of
consumption. Population growth is relatively low: 1.6 per cent per year
in Argentina and only 1.2 per cent in Uruguay. To maintain per capita
domestic consumption and total exports in Argentina and Uruguay at
the 1961—63 level would therefore require a yearly increase of only 1.3
per cent in domestic production between 1962 and 1975. Therefore, if
a policy of high beef prices aiming at restricting consumption and stimu-
lating pro4uction were politically acceptable in Argentina and Uruguay,
these countries could increase considerably the volume of their beef
exportable supplies. On the demand side, part of the reduction in do-
mestic beef consumption could be compensated by an increase in the
consumption of poultry and of pork, both of which are low at present.
On the supply side, with the existing natural resources and high beef
prices to producers, production might perhaps rise at rates comparable
to those recorded in Australia. But the complete elimination of the foot
and mouth disease is essential, if Argentine beef is to enter the U.S.
market.
Only a few developing countries are expected to enter the world mar-
ket as significant exporters over the next decade. In most cases, output
will lag behind demand; but only in those countries with adequate foreign
exchange reserves—the oil countries in particular—will this potential
meat deficit materialize into an effective import demand.
Cereals. The LDC have been rapidly increasing their exports of coarse
grains (maize and sorghum) to high-income countries. Argentina has
kept the lead, but the emergence of Thailand as an important exporter
to Japan and the recent increase in the exports from Mexico and Brazil
are interesting features. Further expansion of LDC exports in the next
decade and entrance of additional countries, in particular Kenya, Uganda,
Tanzania, and Indonesia into the world market is quite possible.
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The prospects are less favorable for wheat, smce, with the important
exception of Japan, the import demand of most high-income countries
• may shrink during the next decade. Argentina, which is a low-cost pro-
ducer, is the only significant exporter among the LDC today. Some other
countries could increase their production sufficiently to export—Mexico
is a case in point—but at a cost generally higher than for the traditional
high-income exporters.
The development that recently attracted world attention was not the
increase in exports of maize and sorghum from a few developing coun-
tries but the increase in wheat imports to the LDC. This rapid rise in
imports, at a time when the U.S. surplus stocks disappeared, caused
concern. Some economists predicted an over-all world cereal shortage
in the near future. The projections, however, do not support this alarm-
ing view.
Under the assumptions made in the FAO projections, the increase in
the net exportable supplies from the high-income countries could cover
the increasing deficit of the LDC, if net imports into China were to re-
main at about their present level. But this projected increase is far from
representing the maximum cereals surplus that could technically be mo-
bilized in the high-income countries. If all available cereal land in North
America and Australia were put into cultivation, the exportable supplies
of the high-income countries could increase by a further 50 million tons
by 1975. Therefore, unless these figures are completely off the mark,
by 1975 the high-income countries would still have the physical capacity
to fill the cereals gapofthe developing countries, even with the
most pessimistic assumptions as to the growth of cereal production in
those countries during the next decade.
The same conclusion was reached in a recent studyofthe USDA.
The study was based on four assumptions regarding the growth of cereal
production in the LDC. The most pessimistic extrapolation over the
1965—80 period of the trend recorded between 1954 and 1966 gave an
increase of 20 million tons in LDC net imports. But it was estimated
that, if acreage restrictions were discontinued in the United States, the
U.S. exportable supplies would rise by 70 million tons between 1965 and
1980. The combination of the two would result in a world surplus of
30 million tons.
It seems, therefore, that for the developed countries with a reserve
potential, in particular the United States, the problem in the next decade
12Definedas the economic demand and not the difference between nutritionally
desirable consumption levels and domestic availabilities.
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will remain management of supplies. A sufficient reserve stock should be
maintained to avoid temporary shortages, since it is not possible to pro-
ject the net grain deficit of the developing countries with the accuracy
require4 for operational purposes.
The margin of error involved in projecting the net cereals deficit of the
LDC is illustrated by the range of projections corresponding to the vary-
ing assumptions in the FAO and in the USDA studies. In the FAO study
the net deficit of 10 million tons in 1961—63 could either disappear or
increase to 25 million tons by 1975, depending on whether the assump-
tion is optimistic or pessimistic. In the USDA study the projected net
deficit of the LDC ranges from 6 to 39 million tons in 1980. This wide
margin reflects the marginal character of the net deficit (4 per cent of
total LDC production in 1961—63), the uncertainty regarding the rate of
adoption of improved techniques, and the impact of government policies
(price and food aid policies in particular) on production in the LDC.
In regard to the marginal character of the deficit, a difference of 10
million tons in the projection for 1975 under the high FAO assumption
would correspond to the difference between an average production
growth of 2.7 and 2.5 per cent a year in the LDC, for a given level of
demand. Anyone familiar with agricultural statistics in the LDC will
recognize that a difference of 0.2 per cent is within the margin of error
of the estimation of past trends; it is well within the margin of error of
any projection.
Wood-products and miscellaneous. The prospects for exports from LDC
to high-income countries are good for round wood and wood panels and
for oilcakes, fishmeal, and a variety of miscellaneous items such as off-
season fruits and vegetables and various tropical fruits still largely un-
known on Western markets. The small miscellaneous items are often
those with the most dynamic growth, but none is important enough at
present to merit a review of its prospects in a paper of this scope.
MAJOR EXPORT MARKETS FOR THE LDC
In the following section we will analyze the prospects for agricultural
exports of LDC by main areas of destination.
Developed Countries with Market Economies
Taking all agricultural products together, developed countries import
from the rest of the world more than they export. Their net imports—
*•
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• 1 TABLE7
Trends in the Volumea of Gross Agriculturallmports and Exports
1952-54 to 1961-63 for Developed and Developing Countries
(averagepercentage per annum compounded)
Developed Countries



















beverages 3.5 1.4 3.5 5.2 3.7 3.6
Agric. raw
material 1.8 4.0 —.4 3.4 2.9 2.8
Source: Agricultural Commodities Projections 1975 Vol. II,table
111.9,p. 306, Rome, 1967.
aweighted at 1961-63 prices.
-
excess of gross imports over gross exports—increased very slowly in the
postwar period. This is illustrated in Table 7 showing the trends in the
volume of trade between 1952—54 and 1961—63. During that period,
gross agricultural exports from developed countries increased rapidly
(5.5 per cent a year). Gross imports into these countries, despite the
intensification of intraeuropean trade, progressed more slowly (3.3 per
cent a year) reflecting an apparent elasticity of 0.8 in relation to GDP.
Net imports into developed countries from the rest of the world increased,
in volume terms, by only 1 per cent a year for all agricultural products,
by 3.5 per cent for coffee, cocoa, and tea under the stimulation of declin-
ing prices, and by 1 per cent for sugar, oils, and oilseeds; for agricultural
raw materials, net imports declifted slightly.
An accurate picture of the imports into developed countries from de-
veloping countries can be derived from the UN trade data systematically
recorded in recent years by origin and destination. The trends over the
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The rapid economic expansion of the developed countries during the
first half of the 1960's led to a remarkable expansion of their imports
from LDC. But the high rate of growth of gross exports from LDC to
the developed countries (6.4 per cent a year) between 1960 and 1965
resulted from the combination of two different developments: a very fast
increase in the volume of nonagricultural exports (10 per cent a year)
and a slow expansion in the volume of agricultural exports (2.3 per cent
a year). The impact of GDP growth in developed countries on their
import demand from LDC can be expressed in two components: the
population effect (1.2 per cent a year) and the income effect measured
by the elasticity of imports per capita relative to GDP per capita. The
apparent income elasticity thus calculated on a per capita basis amounts
to barely one third for agricultural commodities, compared with two and
a half for nonagricultural commodities.
The growth of agricultural imports into developed countries during
the first half of the 1960's is compared in Table 9 with the FAO growth
• projections for 1970. In this study, the projections were confined to
exports of tropical food and beverages and agricultural raw materials
from the LDC to the developed countries. Exports of temperate-zone
food (cereals and livestocks) were not included because en bloc the LDC
are a net importer for this group of products. The average unit value
of LDC agricultural exports did not show much change between 1960
and 1965, and the actual GDP growth of the developed countries in
this period was close to that of the high-income assumption (5 per cent
a year). Therefore, in Table 9 the annual percentage growth in the vol-
ume of imports from 1960 to 1965 was compared to the average per-
centage growth projected under the high-income assumption without any
adjustment.
The trends recorded between 1960 and 1965 are well in line with those
projected under the high assumption. The most important discrepancies
appearing in Table 9 are for sugar and oils in the commodities group,
and North America in the importing areas group. However, the declines
recorded between 1960 and 1965 under these two headings reflect the
22 per cent reduction in the volume of U.S. sugar imports from LDC
associated with the Cuban crisis. This reduction, due to particular cir-
cumstances, does not a basis for extrapolation over a twelve-year
period. If the volume of U.S. sugar imports had remained constant be-
tween 1960 and 1965, most of the discrepancy would have been removed
(see note Table 9).
Since 1965, the rate of economic expansion of the developed countries
has been slackening and this has been reflected in a reduction in the






Per Cent Per Cent
Index 1970 Per Year Per Year
(1957-58 =100)CompoundedCompounded
By commodity group
Sugar, oils, oilseeds 102 0.2
Coffee, cocoa, tea 136 2.6 2.5
Agricultural raw
materials 138 2.7 2.7
Total (including citrus) 127 2.0
By importing area
North America 116 1.2
Western Europe 123 1.75 2.1
Japan 175 4.8
Total (including Oceania) 127 2.0
6.4
1,75a
Source: Index 1970 —FAOCommodity Projections for 1970, table
17 p. 1—35, Rome, March 1962; percentages for 1958-70 derived from
index projections; percentages for 1960—65 from unpublished IBRD
study by B. Balassa.
the volume of U.S. sugar imports from LDC had been the same
in 1905 as in 1060, —1.0 for sugar and oils would have been replaced
by +.4,1.75 for the total by 2.1, and —.2 for North America by +.8
growth of their imports from the LDC. In the second half of the 1960's
the growth in the developed countries might therefore be closer to the
low than to the high assumption in the 1970 projection (low, 3.9 per
cent; high, 5 per cent).
The 1970 projections of me import demand in developed countries
for the agricultural products of developing countries were considered
gloomy at this time. The analysis carried out in 1966—67 for the prepara-
tion of the 1975 projections did not give a more favorable picture. This
pessimistic view resulted from a combination of four main factors in the
Growth of Volume Imports to Developed Countries from LDC of
Tropical Food and Beverages and Agricultural Raw Materials;
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develope4 countries: (1) slackening in the rate of population growth;
(2) per capita consumption moving toward saturation for sugar, oils
and fats, and tropical beverages; (3) increasing replacement of agricul-
tural raw material by synthetics; and (4) continued tendency for food
output to increase faster than demand for food.
In developed countries food consumption—valued at farm prices—is
projected to increase by 1.7 to 1.9 per cent a year. Food production
increased on the average by 2.5 per cent a year since 1950, the rate of
growth showing no sign of slackening towards the en4 of the period.
Food production is therefore likely to move ahead of food consumption
in developed countries, and maintaining income parity between farm and
nonfarm occupations will remain a major problem. Since the share of
purchased inputs in gross food output will continue to increase, the value
added by the agricultural sector is not expected to show much progress.
Consequently, much of the improvement in per capita farm income will
have to come from further reductions in the size of the farm labor force.
In this context reducing domestic production (that of sugar beets for
example) substantially to allow for larger imports from LDC will be
politically difficult. Moreover, with the increasing flexibility in the pro-
duction pattern, restricting production of one commodity may stimulate
production of others with a consequent reduction in imports of the
latter.
On the whole, the FAO projections for 1975 give an unfavorable pic-
ture.14 Excluding wheat, dairy products, and forestry products, for which
LDC are, and will remain, major net importers, the net import demand
in developed countries for agricultural products (coarse grains, feeding-
4
stuff,and meat included) of undeveloped countries is not projected to
rise by more than 2 per cent a year even un4er the high-income assump-
tion. This represents a significant slowdown in relation to past trends.
The price of tropical noncompeting food and beverages could be main-
tained and in some cases improved by appropriate international action,
but such action would in all likelihood be more than offset by the decline
in the price of agricultural raw materials. On the whole, the margin for
maneuver appears rather limited.
The decline in the growth of net agricultural exports from developing
to developed countries partly reflects the increasing disparity between
these two groups of countries in respect to agricultural land available per
14Themain agricultural products not included in the FAO trade projections
for 1975 are: starchy roots, pulses, vegetables, fruits other than bananas and citrus,
and fish.48 Agriculture in World Economy
capita. The following figures quoted by Kristensen 15inthis regard are
quite impressive. In 1965 there was, on the average, twelve times the
agricultural land per head of the agricultural population in the developed
countries that there was in the Far East (excluding mainland China).
In the year 2000, the corresponding ratio could be 50 to 1, that is four
times that of today. Kristensen notes that a sharp reduction in the size
of agricultural holdings will not facilitate the adoption of modern tech-
nology, and he stresses the need for a modification of the traditional
trade pattern between developed and developing countries.
Socialist Countries
Agricultural exports from the LDC to countries with centrally planned
economies increased very rapidly in the first half of the 1960's. Between
1960 and 1965 this flow of trade to Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R.
increased by 12 per cent a year and that to mainland China increased
even more rapidly (see Table 8). It is very difficult to make any forecast
for mainland China, but there are good reasons to believe that the 12
per cent yearly rate of growth registered by Eastern Europe and the
U.S.S.R. in the past will be very substantially reduced during the next
decade.
Agricultural imports from LDC to Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R.
comprised two major groups: basic foods and agricultural raw materials,
which accounted for $650 million each in 1965, and tropical fruits and
beverages, accounting for only $240 million. The very rapid increase in
basic food imports during the first half of the 1960's was heavily weighted
by the large sugar imports from Cuba. This is a one-time effect that
should not be extrapolated. For agricultural raw materials, imports in-
creased only by 4 per cent a year between 1960 and 1965, and future
growth is uncertain. In 1965, production of synthetics in the U.S.S.R.
was surprisingly low, reaching only half of the U.K. output. The produc-
tion of synthetics may increase sharply during the next decade. Because
of the heavy emphasis placed on petrochemical synthetics such an in-
crease might further reduce import needs for natural products in this
sector. The past rate of import growth could be maintained only for
noncompeting food and beverages—per capita consumption remaining
very low. But in 1965 noncompeting tropical food and beverages ac-
counted for only 15 per cent of agricultural imports to Eastern Europe
and the U.S.S.R. from LDC.
Organizationfor Economic Cooperation and Development [OECDI The Food
Problem of the LDC, 1967, Chapter 4.Less Developed Countries 49
Developing Countries
Since the possibilities of expanding LDC agricultural exports to high-
income countries are severely limited, it is of particular importance to
investigate the scope for expanding trade between the developing coun-
tries themselves. Today, about one-third of LDC food exports (includ-
ing beverages and tobacco—sections 0, 1 and 4 and division 22) goes to
other developing countries. After a period of stagnation during the
1950's, this flow of trade expanded substantially in the 1960's. From
1961 to 1965 LDC food exports to other developing countries increased
in percentage terms more rapidly than LDC food exports to the rest of
the world.
The expansion of agricultural trade between the LDC raises questions
on both the demand and supply sides of the trade picture. First, how
fast are LDC import needs likely to rise, and which part of these needs
• could materialize in an effective demand? Second, could the exportable
supplies of the needed commodities increase rapidly enough in a number
of developing countries to allow for the expansion of such intratrade
• in addition to LDC agricultural exports to high income countries?
On the demand side, the needs for agricultural imports are bound to
increase more rapidly in the LDC than in the high-income countries.
As previously noted, between 1952—54 and 1961—63, gross agricultural
imports into the LDC increased on the average by 5.3 per cent a year.
During the same period the volume of gross agricultural imports into
developed countries increased by only 3.3 per cent a year, and this was
due in part to a rapid expansion of intraeuropean trade. During the first
half of the 1960's, despite an exceptionally high rate of economic growth,
gross agricultural imports into developed countries from developing coun-
tries increased by only 2.3 per cent a year.
During the next two decades population will increase twice as fast in
• the developing than in the high-income countries and per capita con-
sumption of most commodities will remain far from saturated. Demand
for food valued at producer prices is projected to increase twice as fast
in the LDC as in the high-income countries. Urbanization will be the
key factor in the increase in LDC food imports. Between 1962 and 1985,
the urban population might increase by 580 million in the developing
countries (excluding mainland China) as compared with only 140 mil-
lion in the developed countries. The urban population of the developing
• countries, which was smaller than that of the developed countries in
1962, would be 70 per cent larger in 1985.
'I50 Agriculturein World Economy
In view of the differences in natural endowment, it would be uneco-
nomical for each developing country to aim at self-sufficiency. If food
aid is not used indiscriminately, these import needs should largely mate-
rialize in a commercial demand. Among developed countries with market
economies the most rapid increases in food imports in recent years have
been recorded in southern Europe and Japan. On the basis of the high
FAO income assumption, thirty developing countries will reach or exceed
by 1985 the average income level recorded for southern Europe and
Japan in 1960. The high FAO income assumption is certainly optimistic,
but the dispersion in the rates of growth between countries will be much
wider than assumed in the FAO study. Preliminary estimates indicate
that in 1966 at least fifteen developing countries with a per capita GNP
ranging from $200 to $600 have recorded a rate of growth higher than
5percent.
On the supply side, the availability of exportable supplies from devel-
oping countries is not as easy to predict. It is sometimes argued that
developing countries are in the position of having mainly cocoa and coffee
surpluses to offer to other developing countries that have little need for
them. The actual situation, however, is quite different, as illustrated in
Table 10.
The scope for cereal trade between developing countries may be
smaller than suggested by the figures in the table, because a large part of
the import requirements would be for food grains and a large part of the
exportable supplies in the form of feed grains. But for oils, sugar, and tea
the scope is very substantial. There is also scope for expanding meat
trade between bordering countries. West Africa, where more cattle could
be exported from the savannah zone to feed the rapidly growing urban
population of the coastal countries, provides an example.
The greatest scope for expanding trade between developing countries
might be in processed and manufactured products. For example the larg-
est potential market for cotton textiles is certainly in the developing coun-
tries themselves. Notwithstanding this, a modern textile industry already
established in several such countries continues underutilized. The same
is true of fertilizers and pulp and paper, for which a demand exists in
developing countries. With fast-growing species of trees in semitropical
climates, several developing countries have the natural resources to ex-
pand production considerably. In many cases production costs could be
kept low if the size of the mill were large enough. This is true in Chile,
for example. In 1962 that country had one integrated Kraft paper mill
(sulphate pulp) producing 60,000 tons a year. Half of this production
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exported. If the capacity of the mill had to be limited to the domestic
market, the capital investment per ton produced would have been almost
twice as high. Tripling the capacity of the mill to reach a production of
180,000 tons—at present under consideration—would almost halve the
capital investment per ton. Since only eleven developing countries have
a GDP equal to or higher than that of Chile, a policy of self-sufficiency
for pulp and paper in most developing countries would be the negation
of efficiency.
According to OECD estimates,16 developing countries would require
by 1980 $5billionforeign exchange for fertilizers (in the form of prod-
ucts or raw materials) compared with $870 million in 1964—65. Some
.ff
developingcountries with oil resources are in an ideal condition to take
advantage of this rapidly expanding market. The raw material to pro-
duce ammonia could be obtained at a very low cost from gas which is
often just burned; energy would be cheap and foreign exchange avail-
able to import the machinery. Here too, as with pulp and paper, econ-
omies of scale are very important. By international standards an efficient
ammonia plant should produce at least 200,000 tons a year in terms of
nitrogen; this corresponds to half the consumption of Africa and one-
third of the consumption of India in 1966. Some of the oil-rich countries
of the Arabian peninsula could make a most useful contribution to agri-
cultural development by providing cheap ammonia to other developing
countries less favored by nature, receiving from them in return food or
manufactured goods (for example, meat from East Africa, irrigation
pumps from India, etc.).
In the manufacturing field a number of developing countries—includ-
ing some that are relatively highly industrialized such as India, Brazil,
Argentina, and Mexico—seem to have reached the economical limit of
import substitution within their national boundaries. An expansion of
trade between developing countries is a way of reducing the disadvan-
tages of national policies of self-sufficiency. The foregoing discussion
suggests that agricultural products in the raw or processed form could
play an important role in the expansion of the trade between developing
countries. The gain would result not so much from the comparative ad-
vantages in the Ricardian sense, as from economies of scale and from
not having to maintain inefficient industries under high protection.
Fortunately, the importance of trade between developing countries
seems to be progressively more recognized. During the first UNCTAD
conference in 1963, this problem did not raise any interest and was
quickly disposed of. But the Algiers charter, adopted by seventy-seven





countries in October 1967 in preparation for UNCTAD II, devotes an
important section to the problem of trade expansion between LDC. One
can also discern an evolution in the attitudes of developed countries and
international agencies, such as GATT an4 IMF in favor of preferential
trade arrangements between developing countries. This change in atti-
tudes has already been reflected in the actual trade pattern. The trade
between developing countries, which remained rather stagnant in the
1950's, increased during the first half of the 1960's by 6.3 per cent a
year, that is, as rapidly as exports from the LDC to developed countries.
AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS WITHIN THE
OVER-ALL EXPORT PROSPECTS
FOR THE LDC
To assess the implications of the LDC export prospects for agricultural
products, it is useful to refer to the UNCTAD projections for 1975. As
previously noted, these projections for agricultural products were based
largely on the FAO study. To integrate the findings of the FAO study
in the UNCTAD projection model, a number of adjustments had to be
made, however.
The UNCTAD projections of LDC exports for the period 1960—75
are summarized in Table 11 by main destinations and commodity groups.
For some of the aggregates an attempt has been made to break up the
fifteen-year projection period given by the UNCTAD into two subperi-
ods, 1960—65 and 1965—75, on the basis of the IBRD data for the single
•f years 1960 and 1965. This breakdown is presented in Table 12, with
f due warning as to the limitations of the exercise.
Tables 11 and 12 suggest that from 1965 to 1975 the rate of growth
LDC exports to the three main groups of countries should not differ
widely. This reflects the considerable implied reduction in the growth
g rate of export to socialist countries in relation to 1960—65. This has to
•
- beinterpreted with great caution in view of the limited knowledge re-
a garding future economic policies in these countries, mainland China in
particular. Regarding agricultural products, the lowest rate of import
growth should be for the developed countries with market economies,
and the highest for socialist countries. In view of the very rapid increase
•£
I inexports of manufactures from LDC during the first half of the 1960's,
the projections implied for 1965—75 may appear conservative. Moreover,
the average export unit value of agricultural products may decline in




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































All commodities 5.1 5.5 6.4 4.5 5.2
Agricultural commodities 1.8 2.2 2.3 1.6 2.2
Food and beverage 2.2 2.5 2.1 2.4 2.7
Agricultural raw materials 1.0 1.6 2.7 0.4 1.3
Nonagricultural commodities7.6 8.0 10.1 6.3 7.0
aSee Table 11.
bFrom Bela Balassa, "Economic Growth, Trade and the Balance of
Payments in LDC, 1960-65" (unpublished).
CComputed by difference.
that the share of agricultural products in the total might be lower, rather
than higher, than indicated. Such considerations fall outside the scope
of this paper, however, and the UNCTAD projections will be used to
analyze the changes in the export pattern of the LDC.
The modification in the commodity composition of LDC exports on
the basis of the UNCTAD projections is shown in Table 13. The modi-
fications are the most pronounced for exports from developing to de-
veloped countries. In this particular flow of trade the most striking fea-
ture is the evolution of the relative share of agricultural products and of
petroleum. The share of agricultural products was about three times that
of petroleum in 1950. In 1960 the ratio had fallen to two to one. By
1965 agricultural products exceeded petroleum by less than 40 per cent.
In 1975 earnings derived from all agricultural products exported from
developing to developed countries are projected at only half of those
derived from petroleum. During the first half of the 1960's the increment
in export earnings of LDC derived from petroleum was almost three
times that derived from all agricultural products. By 1975 the ratio might
be five to one.
A reduction of the share of agricultural products in the export earn-
ings of LDC has two important effects:
The first effect is to increase the outflow of investment income as a
percentage of the total LDC export earnings. Factor income payments
Less Developed Countries 55
TABLE 12




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































generated from an increase in LDC agricultural exports are insignificant;
they are limited to some foreign-owned plantations. But the factor in-
come payments outflow resulting from an increase in petroleum exports
is large. The outflow is substantial for minerals other than fuels and may
not be negligible for manufactured export goods (Hong Kong is an
example).
The second effect is to increase the factor of inequality in the distri-
bution of export earnings among the LDC. Almost every developing
country has an agricultural sector, and most are in a position to export
some agricultural products. This is not the case with petroleum. In 1965
a few oil-exporting countries, which together had only 1.5 per cent of the
total LDC population, accounted for about one-fourth of the total LDC
export earnings. Likewise, exports of minerals other than fuels are not
very widely spread among developing countries, although the concentra-
tion is much less pronounced than for petroleum. In future decades the
rapid expansion of manufactures exports may be in favor of countries
with large population. In the past, however, the picture was different.
Between 1953 and 1965 LDC exports of manufactures increased by 170
per One-fourth of the increase went to Hong Kong, and another
15 per cent to Taiwan and South Korea. Between 1953 and 1965 the
absolute increase in manufactures exports from Hong Kong was two and
a half times that of exports from India.
This widening factor of inequality of export earnings among the LDC
between 1950 and 1965 can be seen from Table 14 and Figure 1. The
developing countries were ranked according to their level of export earn-
ings per capita for a given year. The first line of Table 14 shows that
1950 10 per cent of the population of the LDC received 50 per cent of
their export earnings, while at the other end, only 10 per cent of the
earnings went to 45 per cent of the population. The inequality factor in
the distribution also increased steadily from 1950 to 1965. Thus in 1965,
as shown in the fourth line, only 7 per cent of the population received
half of the earnings (compared with 10 per cent in 1950), while at the
other end 57 per cent shared only one-tenth of the earnings (compared
with 45 per cent in 1950). If all the typical oil countries, as well as Hong
Kong and Singapore are excluded, the picture is a bit more favorable,
but the trend is the same, as shown in lines five and six. The fraction of
the total population receiving only 20 per cent of the earnings increased
from 58 per cent in 1950 to 66 per cent in 1965. It is worth noting that
during that period the reverse occurred among the developed countries:























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note:Based on dat -inTable 14
The combination of these two effects—greater percentage of outflow
of investment income and a wider factor of inequality in the distribution
of income among countries—together with the unfavorable growth of the
net capital inflow go a long way to explain why, despite a higher export
growth in the first half of the 1960's compared with the second half of
the 1950's, the average rate of economic growth of the LDC declined.
Between 1958—60 and 1964—66 the export-import gap of all LDC was
reduced by 1 billion dollars. But this over-all reduction concealed an
increase of 2.4 billion dollars in the export-import surplus of the develop-
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Figure1
Lorenz Curve Illustrating Changes from 1950 to 1965 in the Distribu-
tion of Export Earnings by Countries in Relation to their Population
0 102030405060708090100
CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGE OF EXPORT EARNINGS
IN RELATION TO THE TOTAL EXPORT EARNINGS OF THE GROUP60 Agriculture in World Economy
• ing countries exporting petroleum and an increase of 1.4 billion dollars
in the export-import deficit of the other developing countries.
ANNEX I
Impact of Urbanization on the Accuracy of Demand
Projections Based on National Averages
In many developing countries, particularly Africa, the rural/urban dis-
parity in per capita income is considerable, and urbanization proceeds
at a rapid pace. As a result, the growth rate of the national per capita
income is substantially higher than the weighted average of the urban
and rural rates. Let us consider a country in which per capita income is
three times higher in the urban than in the rural sector and total popu-
lation, of which 15 per cent is initially urban, increases by 2.5percent
a year. if per capita income rises by 2 per cent a year both in the urban
and in the rural sectors, over a ten-year period the average per capita
national income will rise by 2.6 per cent a year. The difference between
2.6 and 2 per cent is explained by the shift into a higher income bracket
of the rural population that migrates into urban areas.
Similarly, for a given commodity the growth rate of per capita con-
sumption for the country as a whole will be higher than the weighted
average of the sectoral growth rates if the per capita consumption level
projecte4 for that commodity is higher for the urban than for the rural
sector or vice versa.18 Whether the weighted average of the sectoral
elasticities will be biased and in which direction, depends, therefore, on
the relative income and consumption patterns in the urban and rural
sectors. Those can be analyzed from nationwide household surveys.
If the same demand function can be fitted to the urban and the rural
population, there is no genuine urbanization effect; the difference in the
per capita consumption level can be entirely explained in terms of per
capita income differentials. The separate projections of the urban and
rural demand will then lead to the same result as a direct projection
based on national averages (using the weighted average of the sectoral
elasticities, provided that if income enters the demand function in the
logarithmic form, the percentage per capita income growth is the same
in the two sectors). But if the demand functions are not the same for
the two sectors, the projection based on national averages is biased.







Figure2 illustrates the case of a positive urbanization effect when the
urban regression line UU' lies above the rural regression line RR'. The
pOints R, U, and C are representative of the average per capita income
and consumption levels in the base year for rural, urban, and nationwide
population, respectively. Points R' and U' refer to the projected year.
If the fraction of the urban population in the total were to remain con-
stant (u'= u), theaverage for the country would be at =uR1J,
R'C' =uR'U').The slope of CC' is the weighted average of the slopes
of the urban and rural regressions + (1 —U)br] whenthe hori-
zontal projections of UU' and RR' are the same, that is, if the increase in
per capita income measured with the appropriate scales is the same for
urban and rural population. The point C' is therefore the one that would
have been projected from national averages using the weighted average
of the sectoral regression coefficients. But, if there is a transfer from rural
to urban population (u' > u), the average for the country will rise from
C' to C": as CC" =(u'—u)R'U'.The projection based on national
averages with the weighted regression coefficient would have led to the
point C'*. The demand would have been underestimated by C'*C".
Figure 3 illustrates a negative urbanization effect. This would often
apply to the types of food produced in the subsistence economy; for
these, per capita consumption can be as high or higher in rural than
urban areas despite the income differential. An extreme example is that
'is








ofmilk consumption between nomadic and urban populations, when
• the nomadic population largely fed on milk progressively disappears
over the projection period.
For all food valued at farm prices the urban demand curve is likely
to lie below that of the rural. In cases of rapid urbanization the projec-
tions of total food valued at farm prices may therefore be overestimated.
This may partly explain the fact that in some developing countries,
despite an increase in per capita national income, per capita food con-
sumption hardly rose.19 More commonly the tendency would be to over-
estimate the demand for the commodities produced in a subsistence
economy and to underestimate the demand for foods not locally pro-
duced. In other words, rapid urbanization would stimulate demand for
imported foods rather than for those traditionally produced in subsistence
economy.
In the covariance analysis of househol4 surveys the total variance V
of income per capita is the sum of the variance between strata VB and
• the variance within strata (VW =(VW)i). The average coefficient
within strata can be written:
ba =
19 It would generally imply that part of the increase recorded in per capita in-
come is artificial and reflects differences of accounting for subsistence and market
production.
•0
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The coefficient b0 obtained without stratification is the weighted aver-
age of the coefficients ba (within strata) and bm (between strata):
(V)b0 =(VW)ba+ (VB)bm
The coefficient bm measures the slope of RU in Figure 2, while the
coefficient ba may be close to the slope of CC' especially ifand bil
have similar values. Consequently, the coefficient b0 estimated without
stratification may not differ much from the slope of CC";atleast it is
biased in relation to ba in the right direction.
This can be illustrated in the case of the United States from the 1955
consumption survey. Households were classified in three groups: rural
farm, rural nonfarm, and urban. Demand functions were computed for
each group and the difference in the relations were analyzed by covari-
ance. If we call (somewhat pejoratively) the shift, rural-farm-to-rural-
• nonfann-to-urban "urbanization," then the urbanization effect on con-
sumption can be characterized by the difference between the regression
coefficients bm (between group averages) and(average within groups).
• This analysis reveals a positive urbanization effect for:fresh citrus,
canned and frozen fruits, vegetables and juices, meat (except beef),
fish, margarine, vegetable oils, and coffee powder. It showed a negative
urbanization effect for: cereals, potatoes, pulses, sugar, fresh vegetables
and fruits (except citrus), eggs, milk products, and cocoa.
Over the period 1955—65 the share of the urban population increased
from 61.5 to 68.1 per cent while that of rural nonfarm and especially
rural farm declined. About one-fifth of the annual growth in the average
U.S. per capita income over this period can be accounted for by this
urbanization process. Using the formula presented at the end of this
annex, a comparison was made between the elasticity coefficientcal-
culated as the weighted average of the elasticity for each group (corre-
sponding to the regression line CC' of Figures 2 and 3) and the coeffi-
cient of elasticitywhichshould have been applied to the national
average to reflect the urbanization process (line CC"). The results are
shown in Table 15 for two commodities: cereals, with a negative urbani-
t zationeffect, and frozen juice, with a positive urbanization effect. The
elasticity(obtainedby weighting the elasticity for each group propor-
tionally to the total consumption of the group) does not greatly differ
fromfla (average within groups) but does differ substantially from the
correct elasticity(reflectingthe urbanization effect). The elasticity
(estimatedfor the entire population without stratifying by group)is
closer than either 'qa or n" to the elasticityreflecting the urbanization
process.
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TABLE 15
Impact of Urbanization on Demand Projections as Reflected
in Elasticities for Two Products, U.S.A.,
(semilog)
Elasticity Cereals Frozen juices
Average within
group —.91(±.08) 3.20(±.21)




effect over 1955-65 —.20 1.15
aElasticities originally obtained in survey made in 1955.
A similar computation was made for Madagascar starting from the
1962 survey which included a stratification between urban and rural
demand. The computation was made working backwards over the period
1950—62, assuming as previously the same percentage per capita in-
come growth in each group. The results (Table 16) show that the ap-
plication of a weighted income elasticity would have led to an insignifi-
TABLE 16
Impact of Urbanization on Demand Projections as Illustrated by
Comparison of Elasticity Reflecting Urbanization and Elasticity







Weightedofurbanandrural,7l 0.04 1.15 0.75 0.92
Including urbanization effect
1950-62,7? 0.03 1.27 0.73 0.91
aElasticities originally obtained in survey made in 1962.
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cant overestimation of the demand for rice, fresh milk, and meat, but to
a significant underestimation of the demand for vegetable oils.
Undoubtedly, the ideal would be to project demand separately for
each sector. But this would require the knowledge of a separate food
balance for each. Due to the lack of comprehensive consumption sur-
veys in most developing countries, one can only measure, in the few
countries where data are available, the bias attached to national vs.
sectoral projections.
Computational Formula
=populationof group (group i refers for example to rural or urban)
i as a fraction of total population in base year.
=populationof group i as a fraction of total population in projected
year.
=averageper capita income of group i over average per capita income
of total population in base year.
=averageper capita consumption of commodity] for group i divided
by average per capita consumption of commodity] for total popu-
lation in base year.
=ratioof per capita income of group i: value projected over value in
base year.
=ratioof per capita consumption of commodity] for group i: value
projected over value in base year.
=incomeelasticity of the demand for commodity fin group i in the
base year.
For the entire population the increase of average per capita income in
terms of ratio of projected income over income in base year can be written:
X = =X*+-
I I
withthe weighted average of the sectoral ratio
1* =
Similarly for the increase of the average per capita consumption:
= =+(a —
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With a semilog demand function, the relation between increase in con-
sumption and income can be written for group 1:
—1=
• Withweightedaverage of the sectoral income elasticities 77j5:
• =
andelasticityrelating actual increments in national per capita income
and consumption reflecting simultaneously the pure income effect and
the modification in the sectoral composition of the population.
1', —1=
The relation between the correct elasticityandthe weighted average
elasticitycanbe written:
* * *
(n.j—n,)log X = — Y5—log
The two elasticities coincide =
if. . . — =
* Thisimplies that the group averages fall along a regression line of slope
ANNEXII
impact of an increase of Exports on GDP—Distinction
Between "Accounting" and "induced" Effect
Export may be thought of mainly as a means of securing the imported
goods required for growth. Under this premise the developmental impact
of an expansion of exports—or more precisely, of the increase in the
import capacity thus generated—will depend on the GDP response to
an increase in the import capacity.
During the postwar period the elasticity of imports in relation to
GDP has been close to 1.1 for all developing countries together. In indi-
vidual countries, however, the import elasticity departed substantially
from this average. Thus, among the twenty-nine developing countries
analyzed in the UNCTAD study, the "historical" elasticity fell between
0.9 and 1.3 for ten; below 0.9 for eleven; and at 1.3 or above for eight.
Among the extremes were: Brazil (0.28), Colombia (0.38), Venezuela•
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• (0.39), and Ceylon (0.47) on the one hand; and Nigeria (2.6), Pak-
istan (2.6), Taiwan (1.86), and Chile (1.82) on the other.
If exports are taken as exogenous, the developmental impact of exports
• on GDP can be estimated by regressing GDP (at constant prices) on
exports (deflated by average import unit value). During the postwar
period the elasticity of GDP in relation to exports, thus estimated, was
found significant (t>3)for twenty-five countries. The elasticity was
equal to 1.1 for one country. It fell between 0.7 and 0.81 for ten;
between 0.5 and 0.7 for seven; between 0.3 and 0.5 for three; and below
zero for four. If we take 0.7 as the most common value, then a 10 per
cent increase in export earnings is often associated with a 7 per cent
• increase in GDP.
Simultaneity between the increase of exports and GDP does not mean
causality. For example, one would not like, a priori, to say that, in the
case of the four countries with an apparent negative elasticity, the
growth of GDP was due to the decline in exports. When the time trend
elements in GDP and exports are removed, either by introducing time
as an additional variable or by regressing the first differences, the rela-
tion between the fluctuations in export earnings and GDP becomes very
• weak. Moreover, the correlation between the rates of growth of GDP
and export earnings between countries is low. Taking all the thirty-nine
countries for which data were available, only 20 per cent of the variance
in the rates of GDP growth is explained by variations in the rates of
export growth. Eliminating the thirteen countries for which the rates of
growth are not significant, only 12 per cent of the variance is explained.
The relation between the growth of exports and GDP, therefore,
to be analyzed in greater depth. 4
Assumingconstant prices; a given increase in exports will generally
be associated with a somewhat smaller increase in the value added by
the export sector. This difference is due to the deduction of the import
content of the incremental export and of the inputs from the nonexport
sectors incorporated in the export goods. The net import capacity of the
country will rise by the difference between the increase in exports and
the import content of the incremental exports. This rise, in the nature
of an "accounting" increase, would be very small if the increase in ex-
ports reflected mainly an expansion of reexporting activities, or if the
country started from full utilization of resources with optimal allocation.
On the other hand, if the import content and the production foregone
• in the nonexport sectors were negligible, the automatic increase in GDP
and net import capacity would approximate the increase in exports. In
• brief, an increase of ten dollars in gross exports will be automatically
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associated with an increase in GDP and net import capacity of some-
where between zero and ten dollars. This "automatic" increase reflects
accounting identities. The problem is to know what will be the impact
on the economy of this increase in disposable income and import capacity.
Let us assume an automatic increase of seven dollars. At one extreme,
this amount could be absorbed entirely by an increase in domestic con-
sumption and be balanced by an equal increase in imports of consumer
goods, without any impact on domestic production. In such a case, the
increase in exports during the first round would not induce in subsequent
rounds any increase in domestic production and GDP.
At the other extreme, the seven-dollar increase in import capacity
could be entirely devoted to the importation of equipment. This might
induce an increase in domestic capital formation of more than seven
dollars. If the lack of demand and in particular the lack of foreign equip-
ment were holding back production and investment, potential savings
previously idle and labor and capital previously underutilized might be
brought into motion. The initial gain in export could thus have a large
induced effect on domestic production and GDP, but the full effect would
not be felt immediately.
To summarize: If a one-dollar increase in export earnings is to gen-
erate several dollars increase in GDP, the induced effect has to be large,
and most of it will probably not be felt during the same year as the
initial increase in exports. It might therefore be possible, through distrib-
uted lag functions, to express the response of GDP to an increase in
export earnings in the form of two components: a short-term and a
long-term elasticity.
Within one year one would not expect that one dollar increase in
exports will generate very much more than one dollar increase in GDP
since only part of the induced effect could be felt. If, however, within
a rigidly planned economy, a windfall in export earnings were the only
way to correct misallocation of foreign exchange, for example by import-
ing spare parts, the induced effect could be sizable in the short term; but
this is likely to be the exception rather than the rule. One could there-
fore expect the short-term elasticity to range from zero to somewhat
above the ratio of exports to GDP. But the long-term elasticity could be ' •
muchhigher.
The value of the short-term elasticity will depend greatly on the
nature of the increase in exports: for example on whether the terms of
trade or the volume of exports have been modified or the import content
and content of scarce domestic inputs have been incorporated in the ad-
ditional volume of exports, etc. The ratio between the long- and short-
'I4 LessDeveloped Countries 69
term elasticities will depend largely on the state of the economy, in particu-
lar on the existence of bottlenecks, and on the economic policies followed.
The nature of the export industry will also influence the induced effect.
In the case of minerals, the industry is sometimes more closely integrated
with the economy of the developed than with that of the developing
countries, and part of the induced effect may be felt in the importing
countries. On the other hand, when the export sector is closely integrated
with the domestic sector, trade may play a vital role in spreading im-
proved technology throughout the economy; unfortunately this is not
generally the case in the LDC.
To conclude, one cannot expect on theoretical grounds to fin4 much
uniformity in the relation between GDP and export growth in the LDC.
The statistical analysis presented below confirms this lack of uniformity.
In several respects the relation between GDP and export earnings or
import capacity is comparable to the capital-output ratio. It is extremely
convenient to use and it provides an easy argument for illustrating quan-
titatively the beneficial impact of trade and aid. It should be used with
time lags although it is generally used without them. It is not very reli-
able and cannot usually provide more than a rough first approximation.
Statistical Analysis
=GDPin year tatconstant prices.
=Exportearnings in year Ideflatedby average import unit
value.
t= Year.






(5) log—= cst +d log—
Theregression coefficients d(VZ.t) of equation 4 and of equation
5 can be taken as estimates of the short-term elasticity of GDP in relation
to exports. The ratio of the regression coefficients of equation 2
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over of equation 3 can be taken as a first estimate of the long-term
elasticity. These coefficients are linkej by the relation:
2 2 d(gx)= — —R(xg))
or
== + (1 —
Theratio used as a proxy for the long-term elasticity is a poor esti-
mate. If is low, exports do not follow a time trend and the coef-
ficient has not much meaning. If R(a,t) is high, the impact of exports
on GDP cannot be precisely dissociated from the time trend.
Function with Time Lag
(6) log Y(t) =cst +b logX(g) + clogY(tl)
The regression coefficient b is an estimate of the short-term elasticity,
b
the coefficient 1 —c isan estimate of the long-term elasticity.
The results of the statistical analysis, summarized in Tables 17, 18
and 19, suggest the following conclusions:
The function without time lag generally leads to a significant elasticity
of GDP in relation to export earnings. However, the value of the elas-
ticity and in particular the ratio between the rates of growth of
GDP and exports varies rather widely from country to coun-
try. When the time trend is eliminated, the relation between the yearly
fluctuations of GDP and export earnings appears rather loose and
in particularobtained by first differences do not differ significantly
from zero in most cases). In cases where the short-term elasticity is sig-
nificant, it is generally lower than the direct elasticity which in turn
is generally lower than the ratio of the rates of growth (first approxima-
tion of the long-term elasticity). Moreover, the correlation between the
rates of growth of exports and GDP and among countries is
low.
The lagged function (equation 6), shows that the hypothesis of an
induced effect of exports on GDP is consistent with the time series avail-
able in a number of developing countries. As shown in Tables 18 and 19
Thailand provides a good example. Over the period 1950—65, the t ratios
.1•1
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TABLE 17
Regression Without Time Lag
aCoefficient d(xt) does not differ significantly from zero.
of the regression coefficients b and c are highly significant (5.3 and 11);
the long-term elasticity is about 2.5 times the short-term elasticity.
During the postwar period Thailand consistently followed an export-
oriented policy with a minimum of import controls. Since no acute dis-























Cyprus 1959-650.62(6.2)1.43 0.20 0.67(2.5)
Ecuador 1953-63 1.10( 2.9)2.62a0.64 0.13(3.2)
Ethiopia 1961-650.36(10.0)0.67 0.15 0.06(0.5)
Greece 1951-650.52(19.8)0.54 0.04 0.13(2.2)
Guatemala1950-650.81(9.1)0.95 0.19 0.15(1.8)
Honduras 1959-650.38(6.4)1.61 0.63 0.11(2.4)
India 1957-650.78(4.5)1.75 0.34 0.04(0.2)
Iran 1959-650.75(8. 1)0.30 0.23 0.28(2.9)
Iraq 1957-650.74(2.9)1.38 0.38 0.04(0.4)
Korea 1953-650.54(2.2)0.81 0.59 0.20(2.6)

















Panama 1960-650.65(11.0)1.73 0.29 0.17(1.9)
Taiwan 1951-650.76(8.0)0.92 0.22 0.10(2.5)
Tanzania 1960-650.51(3.1) 0.84 0.22(1.6)
Thailand 1953-650.82(11.5)0.93 0.04 0.34(4.9)72 Agriculture in World Economy
TABLE 18
Distributed Log Mode!, Selected Countries



















stable. The export sector was on the whole closely integrated with the
rest of the economy, the five main exports being rubber, rice, tin, maize,
and kenaf (variety of jute). Maize and kenaf were the two dynamic
export commodities (more than 30 per cent yearly growth) that might
have acted as the "engines of growth." The fluctuations 20ofthe export
earnings derived from these two crops, although high (25 per cent for
maize and 40 per cent for kenaf), to only 8.4 per cent for
total export earnings, 6.2 per cent for all imports and 3 per cent for GDP.
20Fluctuationsmeasured as the average absolute value of deviations from a
logarithmic trend:
tog ytlog $'t+tog (i +
=a+bt
f =
n Yt
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